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a detailed analysis of the legal acts that formalized the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine; by 
research into the historical context of their adoption; by an assessment of whether these 
acts conform to international legal standards; and by the testimony of the author of the 
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Introduction
In the beginning was the Word ...1
the Kuchuk-Kainardji Peace treaty of 10 July 1774 and the 1791 Jassy Peace 
treaty between the russian and the ottoman empires provided that Crimea shall be 
an integral part of russia as its “complete, eternal and unquestionable possession” 
(art. 19). the sovereignty of the russian empire over Crimea was confirmed by other 
international legal documents and not challenged after the Crimean War of 1853–
1856. according to the 1856 treaty of Paris, russia was restricted only in maintaining 
its naval forces in the Black Sea.
after fifteen years, this restriction was revoked, and russia fully restored and 
significantly enlarged its sovereign rights over Crimea and Black Sea territorial waters. 
this was the result of the efforts by the minister of Foreign affairs of russia, His Serene 
Highness Prince a.m. Gorchakov, who, according to the testimony of the diplomat and 
poet F.i. tyutchev, “could argue down the whole of europe.”2 it would be appropriate to 
note that “to argue down” meant not the threat or use of force or endless empty talks, but 
coherent legal acts: the skillful composition of the diplomatic notes, general or separate 
negotiations and agreements with the members of the former anti-russian coalition.
1  Bible. Gospel of John. Chapter 1. verse 1.
2  Стихотворение «Велели вы – хоть, может быть, и в шутку…» [verse “you have so commanded, 
albeit perhaps as a joke”].
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in the new millennium, russia must defend Crimea with the same persistence and 
art. But, unfortunately, russian diplomats, unlike Gorchakov, cannot “argue down” 
anybody or do not consider it necessary, which the author of the present article may 
confirm as a participant of a number of Crimean events.
1. Crimean Events of 1994–2014 in the Author’s Perception
You will recognize them by their fruits …3
in 1994–1995 at the request of the first President of the republic Crimea, 
yu.a. meshkov, i participated together with o.G. rumyantsev (head of the working 
group) and v.n. dodonov in consulting on and drafting documents on the 
constitutional reform of the republic Crimea. these materials can be found on 
the official website of o.G. rumyantsev4 and in my book “the Great Constitutions” 
(published by Biblio-Globus Publishing House in 2017).5
at that time our work was not supported in russia. the President of Crimea, 
yu.a. meshkov told us with alarm that the administration of the President of russia 
and the ministry of Foreign affairs had refused to provide any support and that it was 
possible to rely only on the assistance of the office of the mayor of moscow and the 
Black Sea Fleet Command. i can add that at the end of 1994 the administration of 
the President of russia considered our work on the constitutional and legal reforms 
of the republic Crimea to be “provocative.”
the situation dramatically changed in 2014 after a coup d’état in ukraine and 
a referendum on the issue of returning Crimea to russia. However, the efforts of the 
ministry of Foreign affairs of the russian Federation and other federal organs were 
far from a fully-fledged campaign.
in may 2013 i was appointed by the President of russia as a substitute member of the 
european Commission for democracy through Law (venice Commission of the Council 
of europe), which gave me an opportunity to present in march 2014 to the rapporteurs, 
the subcommission, and to the plenary session of the venice Commission, the legal 
position of russia on Crimea (for the text of my comments, see appendix no. 1). this was 
noted with approval in materials published by rossiiskaia Gazeta on 18 april 2014.6
3  Bible. Gospel of matthew. Chapter 7. verse 20.
4  Концепция государственно-правового развития Республики Крым. 1994 [the Concept of State and Law 
development of the republic of Crimea (1994)] (Jun. 2, 2020), available at https://rumiantsev.ru/a486.
5  Лафитский В.И. Великие конституции (Истоки, факторы развития и роль в современном мире) 
[vladimir i. Lafitsky, Great Constitutions (Sources, Factors of Development and Role in the Modern World)] 
(moscow: Biblio-Globus, 2017).
6  Трудности перевода: Как Европейская комиссия принимала решение по крымскому референ-
думу (интервью Т.Я. Хабриевой) // Российская газета. 18 апреля 2014 г. № 6360(88) [difficulties of 
translation: How did the european Commission decide on the Crimean referendum (interview by 
t.ya. Khabrieva), rossiiskaia Gazeta, 18 april 2014, no. 6360(88)] (Jun. 2, 2020), available at https://
rg.ru/2014/04/18/habrieva.html.
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However, it would be appropriate to note, that the legal position of ukraine on Crimea 
was presented at the plenary session of the venice Commission by the minister of Justice 
of ukraine, P. Petrenko.7 representatives of russian State organs did not participate in 
the debates. they were not present at the main part of the subsequent meetings of the 
venice Commission at which issues of Crimea and the russian-speaking population in 
ukraine were considered.8 this contrasted sharply with the active participation of high-
ranking officials of ukraine, in particular the Chairman of the verkhovna rada (and 
later the head of the Cabinet of ministers), v. Groysman; the deputy Chairman of the 
verkhovna rada, o. Syroed; deputy Head of the Presidential administration, a. Filatov; 
the heads of the ministries of Foreign affairs, Justice, and others.
Such activity by representatives of ukraine was widespread. in 2014, i traveled 
frequently and saw with what tireless passion they worked, moving from country 
to country, persistently “knocking on doors” of State organs, and broadcasting via 
foreign mass media their own interpretations of the Crimean events.
official representatives of russia, with the rare exceptions, were not heard. the 
russian embassy in the united States was silent when in February 2014 american 
politicians, including the deputy chairman of the united States Senate Foreign 
relations Committee, were calling on ukrainians to undertake a coup d’état in ukraine 
and to give their lives for freedom, and not just talk about it. many other russian 
diplomatic missions, in particular in France, italy, austria, Germany, and Brazil, were 
in the same “frozen” state of mind.
But this silence was the lesser evil than the speeches of some russian diplomats 
who were giving interviews in July 2014 to the mass media in the european union 
about the “revolution of dignity” in ukraine, failing to remind the audience about 
the unconstitutional coup d’état.
a significant portion of russian officials were confused and were not able to assess 
the events reasonably. this may be confirmed by the adoption of the Federal Law of 
22 July 2014 on the creation of a gambling zone in Crimea. Speaking on 24 July 2014 
at the section of the Security Council of the russian Federation on Crimean events, 
i pointed out the need to abandon this idea because it defamed russia. my comments 
provoked an angry rebuke from a high-ranking official, who said that the decision had 
been made and was not subject to revision ... Fortunately, common sense prevailed. the 
implementation of the idea to create a gambling zone in Crimea was suspended.9
7  98th Plenary Session (venice, 21–22 march 2014), CdL-PL-Pv(2014)001syn (Jun. 2, 2020), available at 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CdL-PL-Pv(2014)001syn-f.
8  at the plenary sessions of the venice Commission in 2014–2015, where the issues of Crimea, ukraine 
and the russian Federation were considered, the position of the russian Federation was in some cases 
represented by the member of the State duma d.F. vyatkin.
9  unfortunately, this idea was revived and, as according to the mass media, the gambling zone in Crimea 
will appear in 2022. on this issue see Игорная зона в Крыму появится к 2022 году // ТАСС. 23 октября 
2019 г. [Gambling Zone in Crimea Will appear by 2022, taSS, 23 october 2019] (Jun. 2, 2020), available 
at https://tass.ru/ekonomika/7033346.
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But the number of strange decisions did not decrease. an example was the erection 
of a monument to “Polite People” in the center of Simferopol on 11 June 2016, which 
confirms that the referendum on the reunification of Crimea with russia was held 
during military confrontation with ukraine, thus making it more difficult to solve the 
task of substantiating and justifying the legitimacy of the referendum.
Such oversights can be attributed to emotional euphoria or to the pathological 
inability of russian politicians to assess the consequences of proposed actions. But 
such explanations are unconvincing in the light of other events associated with 
Crimea and bringing russia closer to a suicidal war.
a considerable share of the blame ought to be shared by russian politicians 
dreaming, contrary to the russian Constitution, of a “military-police state”; who 
publicly call, in violation of the Criminal Code of the russian Federation, to unleash 
a war and, at the same time, do not forget to increase their assets abroad; who reject, 
without reasonable grounds, proposals that can divert or at least postpone the threat 
of isolation and destruction (disintegration) of the State.
the foregoing is confirmed by facts that have become an everyday media reality. 
We address only one question: the fate of the draft Federal Law “on the recognition 
of normative Legal acts of the uSSr and the rSFSr on the transfer of Crimea from 
the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr as not Generating Legal Consequences from the 
moment of their adoption and not Having Legal Force due to the Failure of these 
acts to Conform to Fundamental Principles of international Law and the rule of 
Law State.”
this draft law, prepared by the author of the present article (the text is reproduced 
in english in the appendix no. 2),10 was rejected by a number of federal departments, 
claiming that it “would question all previously adopted interrelated constitutional 
provisions that shaped the State structure of the uSSr and the rSFSr and their 
subject composition” and that it would entail “negative consequences for our 
country.”
it is unclear what “our country” they were talking about, taking into account 
that the russian Federation as the legal continuer of the uSSr and the rSFSr has to 
recognize the unrepealed “Crimea acts” of 1954 and that the preservation of the legal 
force of these acts creates not speculative, but absolutely real negative consequences, 
threatening not only the loss of Crimea, but the destruction of russia as a whole. this 
was the subject of my article sent to the newspaper “rossiiskaia Gazeta” in april 2018, 
but it “disappeared” in the labyrinth of consultations and approvals.
10  the draft law was prepared by the author of the present article on the assignment of the Foundation 
for Constitutional reforms. the text of the draft law in russian is published in: Лафитский В.И. 
О правовом наследии России и его возрождении в борьбе за право [vladimir i. Lafitsky, On Legal 
Heritage of Russia and its Renaissance in the Struggle for Law] 75–80 (moscow: iustitsinform, 2018).
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2. On the Need to Strengthen the Legal Position  
of Russia on Crimea
And the rain came, and the rivers overflowed, and the winds blew, 
and rushed on that house, and it did not fall, because 
it was founded on a stone ...11
the legal position of the russian Federation on Crimea should be built on “stone,” 
not on a sandy foundation, in order to exclude “its great fall.” this task urgently 
requires strengthening the legal position of russia on Crimea. But the five-year 
efforts of the administration of the President and the ministry of Foreign affairs 
have made them weaker.
on 21 march 2014, russia’s legal position on Crimea, as presented at the plenary 
session of the venice Commission of the Council of europe, was based on the 
arguments that:12
– throughout most of Soviet history Crimea was an integral part of russia and 
was transferred to ukraine in violation of the requirements of the constitutions and 
legislation of the uSSr and the rSFSr in force at that time;
– the referendum held in Crimea on 20 January 1991 reflected the desire of the 
population of Crimea to join the Soviet union, of which the russian Federation is the 
legal continuer;
– the Constitution of the republic Crimea of 6 may 1992 vested the government 
of Crimea with full authority, with the exception of the powers voluntarily delegated 
to ukraine;
– the Supreme Soviet of the russian Federation enacted the decree of 21 may 
1992, no. 2809-1, which proclaimed that it did not recognize the legitimacy of the 
normative legal acts of the union of Soviet Socialist republics (uSSr) and the russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist republic (rSFSr) on the transfer of Crimea to ukraine, and 
that this decree retains the legal force for the russian Federation;
– the development of the statehood of the republic of Crimea as an autonomous 
entity of ukraine was forcibly interrupted on 17 march 1995 with the adoption of the 
Law of ukraine “on the repeal of the Constitution and Certain Laws of the autonomous 
republic of Crimea” and the removal of yu.a. meshkov from the office of the President 
of Crimea;
– the unconstitutional coup d’état in ukraine in February 2014 created a threat to the 
right of the people of Crimea to preserve their statehood and their native language;
– the reunification of the republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol 
with russia was the result of the will of the absolute majority of voters who took 
11  Bible. Gospel of matthew. Chapter 7. verse 25.
12  For the comments by the author presented in the venice Commission, see appendix no. 1.
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part in the referendum on 16 march 2014, and that this decision was confirmed by 
the Constitution of the russian Federation, which established the legal status of 
the republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol as subjects of the russian 
Federation;
– the secession of Crimea from ukraine and reunification with russia are not 
contrary to international law and should be compared with the secession of texas 
from mexico in 1836 and its subsequent joinder to the united States in 1845.
these arguments were advanced in diplomatic documents during 2014. But later 
the administration of the President and the ministry of Foreign affairs of the russian 
Federation abandoned many of them, relying on only one: the “unshakable” argument 
about the legitimacy of the referendum in Crimea. But the world community has not 
recognized the referendum, and it is unlikely that the situation will change. under 
such circumstances, there are two options: to continue to insist on the inviolability 
of the principle by saying: “Let everyone die, but the idea of the referendum shall 
prevail,” or to demonstrate common sense and not rejecting the outcome of the 
referendum, to reinforce the legal position on Crimea, and to defend russia in 
international organizations and courts on a more solid ground.
the main task of the struggle of russia for Crimea is to contest the legality of the 
1954 “Crimea acts” on the basis that they initially had no legal force and could not 
generate legal consequences because of violations of international law.
The 1954 “Crimea Acts” violated Article 1(2) of the Charter of the United Nations 
pertaining to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
this is demonstrated by the algorithm for the adoption of the “Crimea acts.” 
they were initiated on 25 January 1954 by decision of the Presidium of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet union (CPSu) “on Confirmation of 
the draft edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the uSSr on the transfer 
of the Crimean region from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr.” this document was 
born in the central apparatus of the Communist Party and ignored the will of the 
population of Crimea and the state bodies of the rSFSr.
at that time, only the will of the Communist Party (CPSu) mattered, as “the 
leading core of all organizations of the working people, both social and state” (art. 
126 of the 1936 uSSr Constitution). under the totalitarian system of government, 
the decisions of the governing bodies of the Communist Party were not subject 
to discussion. the state bodies of the rSFSr and the uSSr could only “approve” 
them, even without their being adopted in accordance with the procedures and 
requirements as established by law.
on 5 February 1954, the Council of ministers of the rSFSr adopted a decree “on 
the transfer of the Crimean region from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr.” on the 
same day, this decision was confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 
the rSFSr. on 19 February 1954, these enactments were confirmed by an all-union 
body – the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the uSSr. the process was completed 
VLADIMIR LAFITSKY 11
by the Law of the uSSr “on the transfer of the Crimean region from the rSFSr to 
the ukrainian SSr,” adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the uSSr on 26 april 1954 in 
one day, without discussion and secret ballot – just by raising hands so that it was 
possible to see how the deputies were voting.
this procedure for the adoption of the 1954 “Crimea acts” violated constitutional 
norms of the uSSr and the rSFSr. according to the 1936 uSSr Constitution, the 
transfer of any territory could be initiated only at the proposal of a union republic. 
there was no such initiative on part of the rSFSr. instead, there were the decisions 
of the supreme political and State organs of the uSSr. this is demonstrated by the 
adoption of the first “Crimea act” by the Presidium of the Central Committee of 
the CPSu. its title was also illustrative – “on Confirmation of the draft edict of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the uSSr on the transfer of the Crimean region 
from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr.”
it should be noted that according to the 1936 Constitution of the uSSr, the all-
union State organs had only the power to confirm changes in borders between the 
union republics and did not have the power to transfer territories from one union 
republic to another (art. 14(d)). moreover, article 15 of the Constitution of the uSSr 
was violated, which did not allow the all-union State organs to usurp powers not 
enumerated in article 14 of the Constitution as vested in all-union organs. it was 
also prohibited to adopt acts restricting the sovereignty of the union republics or 
creating obstacles preventing the union republics to exercise independently the 
state powers granted to them.
the requirement of the Constitution of the uSSr to obtain the consent of the 
union republic (in this case, the rSFSr) to the transfer of its territory was not observed 
(art. 18). Such transfer could be carried out only through the adoption of a separate 
legal act of the rSFSr or the conclusion of an agreement between the rSFSr and 
the ukrainian SSr. there was no such act or agreement.
the edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the uSSr of 19 February 1954 
“on the transfer of the Crimean region from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr” contained 
a false statement: that it confirmed “a joint submission of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the rSFSr and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the ukrainian SSr to 
transfer Crimean region from the russian Soviet Federative Socialist republic to the 
ukrainian Soviet Socialist republic.” the lack of such joint submission by the two union 
republics (rSFSr and ukrainian SSr) casts doubt on the legal force not only of this edict 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the uSSr, but also of all subsequent acts of 
all-union legislation, including the uSSr Law of 26 april 1954 “on the transfer of the 
Crimean region from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr” and the uSSr Law of 26 april 1954 
“on the Confirmation of edicts of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the uSSr.”
The “Crimea Acts” of 1954 were utilized as an instrument of struggle for political power 
in violation of Article 1(a) of the United Nations Charter on the observance of the principles 
of justice and international law
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When evaluating the “Crimea acts,” it is necessary to take into account their 
political context. First, they emerged as an instrument for opposing (preventing) 
the reunification of the Crimean region and the adjacent shores of the northern 
Black Sea region. For a long time, they had belonged to the pre-revolutionary tauride 
Governate, later the Soviet republic of tauride, and were transferred to the ukrainian 
SSr only in 1920.13
the plans for expanding the territorial boundaries of the Crimean region were 
discussed during the early postwar years with a view to restoring its socio-economic 
and demographic potential, severely damaged in the Second World War. this gave 
the russian historian, v. Kruglov, grounds for asserting that the transfer of Crimea 
to ukraine should be perceived “not as an ordinary decision of an economic scale, 
but as a mean for averting the danger of losing territories received from the rSFSr 
by the ukrainian SSr”; this added a “political hue” to the aforesaid events.14
this assessment is confirmed by other facts. the adoption of the 1954 “Crimea 
acts” was timed to coincide with the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslavs’ka rada, 
which proclaimed the eternal unity of the Zaporozhian Cossack Host (army) with the 
russian realm. and, undoubtedly, n.S. Khrushchev utilized the transfer of Crimea as 
a “bargaining chip” and an instrument for raising support of party officials of ukraine 
in his struggle for political power over the Central Committee of the CPSu and the 
Soviet union in the whole.
a convincing illustration was provided by the testimony of a prominent party 
official, d.t. Shepilov, who in 1953 held the positions of a chairman of the standing 
committee of the CPSu Central Committee on ideological issues and editor-in-chief 
of the major newspaper of the CPSu, “Pravda.” He accused Khrushchev of committing 
political bribery by asserting that the transfer of Crimea to ukraine was aimed to 
demonstrate his generosity to the whole of ukraine, so that “the ukrainian people 
regard him as their ... patron.”15
Such actions were in violation of the principles of justice provided for in article 1 
of the u.n. Charter. the 1954 Crimea acts also infringed the provisions of the 
uSSr Constitution and the u.n. Charter which required that the principle of self-
determination of peoples be observed. no referendums (or voting) were held in 
the rSFSr and Crimea on transfer of Crimea to ukraine; local representative organs 
13  See Панов В., Чичкин А. Как Крым Украине отдали: О «белых пятнах» в истории передачи полу-
острова из РСФСР в УССР // Столетие.ru. 24 января 2014 г. [valery Panov & alexey Chichkin, How 
Crimea Was Given to Ukraine: On the “White Spots” in the History of the Transfer of the Peninsula from 
the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR, Stoletie.ru, 24 January 2014] (Jun. 2, 2020), available at http://www.
stoletie.ru/territoriya_istorii/kak_krym_ukraine_otdali_982.htm.
14  See Круглов В. Передача Крымской области Украине (1954 г.): истоки, ход, дискуссионные сюжеты, 
последствия // Крым: память, право, воля. 1954–2014. 2014–2019 [vladimir Kruglov, Transfer of 
the Crimean Region to Ukraine (1954): Origins, Procedure, Discussion Topics, Consequences in Crimea: 
Memory. Law. Will. 1954–2014. 2014–2019] 89, 96 (moscow: astreia-tsentr, 2019).
15  Шепилов Д.Т. Непримкнувший. Воспоминания [dmitry t. Shepilov, Not Adjoined. Memories] 303, 
308 (moscow: vagrius, 2001).
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of Crimea were not involved in the discussion of this issue, despite the principles of 
international law, as specified in article 1(1) of the u.n. Charter.
The 1954 “Crimea Acts” violated Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations on 
the principle of inadmissibility of the use of force or the threat of the use of force against 
the territorial integrity of states
although the 1954 “Crimea acts” violated the principles of international law and 
the constitutions of the uSSr and the rSFSr, they did not provoke protests or even 
discussions, which may be explained by only one fact. the acts of the secession of 
Crimea from russia were adopted under a totalitarian political regime which doomed 
to repression everyone who dared to express objections or doubts.
on 16 January 1954, the first secretary of the Crimean regional committee of 
the CPSu, P.i. titov, who had been summoned to moscow to take part in discussing 
the plan, concerning the transfer of Crimea to ukraine, was promptly removed from 
his post at the moment he started to express his doubts. in his place, another Party 
functionary was appointed who was willing to obey any orders or instructions.
to understand the situation of that time, it is necessary to take into account the 
following. one year before the adoption of the “Crimea acts,” about 2.62 million 
people were detained in prisons (one of every 70 citizens of the uSSr, including 
newly-born children). according to the official data, starting from 1921 to 1 February 
1954 approximately 3,777 million citizens of the uSSr were convicted for counter-
revolutionary activities, of whom 2,369 million were imprisoned, 765 thousand were 
exiled, 642,9 thousand were executed.16 Hundreds of thousands (possibly millions) 
of citizens of the Soviet union were murdered without charge or trial. Proposals or 
demands to leave Crimea as a part of russia were perceived under the 1926 Criminal 
Code of the rSFSr as “propaganda or agitation containing calls for the overthrow, 
undermining or weakening of Soviet power...” (art. 58.10(1)).
moreover, such acts committed “with the use of ... national prejudices of the 
masses” (art. 58.10(2)) were punishable by “the highest measure of social defense,” 
as established by article 58.2:
death by shooting or declaration as an enemy of workers with confiscation 
of property and deprivation of the citizenship of the union republic and, 
thereby, of the citizenship of the uSSr and expulsion from the uSSr forever, 
provided that it is permitted under the extenuating circumstances to assign 
a penalty of imprisonment for a term of at least three years, with confiscation 
of all or part of the property.17
16  See Земсков В.Н. ГУЛАГ (историко-социологический аспект) // Социологические исследования. 
1991. № 6. С. 10–27; 1991. № 7. С. 3–16 [victor n. Zemskov, GULAG (Historical and Sociological Aspect), 
6; 7 Sociological research 10; 3 (1991)].
17  as amended on 6 June 1927. See Электронный фонд правовой и нормативно-технической 
документации «Кодекс» [electronic fund of legal and normative-technical documentation “Codex”] 
(Jun. 2, 2020), available at http://docs.cntd.ru/document/901757374.
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violence and fear – these are the factors that explain the swift and silent 
implementation by the state authorities of the uSSr and the rSFSr of the decision of 
the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSu to separate Crimea from russia.
another circumstance is directly related to this issue. in the uSSr of that time, 
any mention of national interests came into conflict with State ideology, consistently 
imposed since the mid-1920s. this is well illustrated by the following statement by 
i.v. Stalin concerning the territorial claims of the ukrainian SSr:
From the point of view of the development of the main issues of our policy 
and our work, of course, it does not have any serious significance; when we 
speak about such States as ukraine and rSFSr ... it is just a question of pure 
practice.18
this ideological position was more fully substantiated five years after the sepa-ration 
of Crimea from russia in the 1961 third Program of the CPSu (Sec. iv of Part two):
People of many nationalities live and work together in the Soviet republics. 
the borders between the union republics within the uSSr are increasingly 
losing their former significance, since all nations are equal, their life is built on 
a single socialist basis and the material and spiritual needs of each people are 
equally satisfied, they are all united by common vital interests into one family 
and together are moving towards a common goal – communism ...19
Protests pertaining to Crimea’s separation from russia manifested themselves in 
various forms only at the end of “Khrushchev’s thaw.” one example was the following 
letter written by several citizens of the uSSr in august 1964 to the Chairman of the 
uSSr Constitutional Commission, n.S. Khrushchev:
How can russia, having the best, greatest values, constituting its adornment – 
Crimea, which in its territory exceeds Belgium or Switzerland, give away this 
entire state ... How could they have given away this russian jewel, this russian 
heritage, without informing the russian people? a russian citizen could not 
give Crimea away. this is an anti-state act pursuing a dangerous goal.20
18  РГАСПИ, ф. 558 (Фонд И. Сталина), оп. 1, д. 4490, л. 19–20 [russian State archive of Social and Political 
History. archival Fund of i. Stalin]. For more information see Kruglov 2019, at 106–107.
19  Программа Коммунистической партии Советского Союза // Сайт комсомольцев и коммунистов 
МГУ им. М.В. Ломоносова [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet union, Site of Komsomol 
and Communists of Lomonosov moscow State university] (Jun. 2, 2020), available at http://leftinmsu.
narod.ru/polit_files/books/iii_program_KPSS_files/iii_program_KPSS.htm.
20  the authors of the letter were n. Fillipova, e. Bakunina, i. Khaipova. Quoted by Мякшев А.П. Власть 
и национальный вопрос: Межнациональные отношения и Совет Национальностей Верховного 
Совета СССР (1945–1991) [anatoly P. myakshev, State Power and the National Question: Interethnic 
Relations and the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (1945–1991)] 160–161 (Saratov: 
Saratov university Publishing House, 2004).
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it should be noted that according to the 1936 Constitution of the uSSr, all union 
republics, including the rSFSr, had legal personality under international law. they 
exercised sovereign rights within the powers assigned to them (art. 15). the union 
republics were guaranteed the right to freely secede from the uSSr (art. 17). it was 
prohibited to change the territories of the union republics without their consent 
(art. 18). they were vested with the rights to enter into relations with foreign states, 
to conclude agreements with them, and to exchange diplomatic and consular 
representatives (art. 18a).
therefore, the 1954 “Crimea acts” should be assessed from the standpoint of 
both constitutional and of international law.
For an international legal assessment of the 1954 “Crimea acts” the following 
circumstances have importance:
– the decision to separate Crimea from russia was made by state bodies of the 
uSSr (Soviet union) in favor of the ukrainian SSr (ukraine), which at that time, along 
with the uSSr, was a member of the united nations.
– the Soviet union and the ukrainian SSr as members of the united nations 
were obliged to refrain from threatening or using force with the aim to infringe the 
territorial inviolability of other states, including those that were not, like the russian 
SFSr, the members of the united nations (art. 2(4) of the u.n. Charter).
When explaining the principle of the inadmissibility of the use or threat of force 
for the purpose of changing the territorial boundaries of other states, the united 
nations international Law Commission formulated in 1966 the following guiding 
provisions:
there is general agreement that acts of coercion or threats applied to 
individuals with respect to their own persons or in their personal capacity 
in order to procure the signature, ratification, acceptance or approval of 
a treaty will unquestionably invalidate the consent so procured. History 
provides a number of instances of the employment of coercion against not 
only negotiators but also members of legislatures in order to procure the 
signature or ratification of a treaty …
the use of coercion against the representative of a State for the purpose 
of procuring the conclusion of a treaty would be a matter of such gravity that 
the article should provide for the absolute nullity of a consent to a treaty so 
obtained …
the invalidity of a treaty procured by the illegal threat or use of force is 
a principle which is lex lata … applicable at any rate to all treaties concluded 
since the entry into force of the Charter …21
21  report of the international Law Commission on the Work of its eighteen Session, 4 may – 19 July 1966, 
official records of to the General assembly, twenty-First Session, Supplement no. 9 (a/6309/rev.1), at 246–
247 (Jun. 2, 2020), available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_cn4_191.pdf.
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it would be appropriate to note in this regard, that the transfer of Crimea to 
ukraine was implemented by the totalitarian Communist regime of the Soviet union 
after the entry into force of the Charter of the united nations in 1945. the principle 
of the invalidity of a treaty procured by the illegal threat or use of force as defined 
by the international Law Commission was reiterated in the 1969 vienna Convention 
on the Law of treaties:
the expression of a State’s consent to be bound by a treaty which has 
been procured by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats 
directed against him shall be without any legal effect [art. 51];
a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use 
of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the united nations [art. 52].
We further note that the vienna Convention broadly defined the concept of 
a “treaty” as
an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or 
in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation 
[art. 2(1)(a)].
the vienna Convention covers not only treaties establishing the european union, 
but also many acts of internal law of the member states of the united europe.
the same approach should be applied to the 1954 “Crimea acts” because the 
uSSr until its collapse in 1991 was a state based on a voluntary union and equal 
legal standing of its member states.
3. On Further Measures to Protect Russian Crimea
Having lit a candle, they do not put it under the vessel, 
 but on a candlestick, and it shines on everyone 
in the house22
there is an urgent need for decisive measures to protect the legal position of 
russia relating to Crimea.
one step should be the submission to the State duma of the Federal assembly 
of the russian Federation of the draft Federal Law “on recognizing the normative 
Legal acts of the uSSr and the rSFSr on the transfer of Crimea from the rSFSr to 
22  Bible. Gospel of matthew. Chapter 5. verse 15.
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the ukrainian SSr as not Generating Legal Consequences from the moment of their 
adoption and not Having Legal Force due to the Failure of these acts to Conform 
to Fundamental Principles of international Law and rule of Law State.”
the necessity to adopt such law is determined by the fact that the russian 
Federation is the legal continuer of the uSSr and the rSFSr, which is proclaimed by 
article 67.1 of the Constitution of the russian Federation and is confirmed by many 
federal laws.23 as noted above, the transfer of Crimea from the rSFSr to the ukrainian 
SSr was carried out in violation not only of the requirements of the Constitution of 
the Soviet union and the Constitution of the russian SFSr, concerning the allocation 
of powers between the state authorities of the Soviet union and the russian SFSr and 
decision-making procedures, but also of the fundamental principles of international 
law, including the Charter of the united nations.
Such violations give grounds to assert that the following acts cannot be recognized 
as valid from the moment of their adoption and that they do not have legal force: 
decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSu dated 25 January 
1954 “on Confirmation of the draft edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the uSSr on the transfer of the Crimean region from the rSFSr to the ukrainian 
SSr”; decree of the Council of ministers of the rSFSr “on the transfer of the Crimean 
region from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr” dated 5 February 1954; edict of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the rSFSr “on the transfer of the Crimean region 
from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr” dated 5 February 1954; edict of the Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet of the uSSr 19 of February 1954 on the Confirmation of the 
draft edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the uSSr “on the transfer of 
the Crimean region from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr”; Law of the uSSr “on the 
transfer of the Crimean region from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr” dated 26 april 
1954, which confirmed the edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the uSSr 
dated 19 February 1954; amendments to articles 22 and 23 of the Constitution of 
the uSSr, introduced by the uSSr Law “on the transfer of the Crimean region from 
the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr” dated 26 april 1954 (art. 2(1)).
the adoption of such federal law (the draft law is attached as appendix no. 2) can 
significantly strengthen the position of russia on Crimea, by giving strong impetus 
to the debates on the 1954 “Crimea acts” in international organizations.
23  the status of the russian Federation as a continuer and successor of the uSSr is confirmed by the 
Federal Law of 15 July 1995 “on international treaties of the russian Federation.” it states that the 
effect of the Federal Law extends to international treaties, in which the russian Federation is a party 
as the state-continuer of the uSSr (art. 1(3)). the preamble of the Federal Law of 24 may 1999 “on the 
State Policy of the russian Federation in relation to Compatriots abroad” confirms that the russian 
Federation is the continuer and legal successor of the russian state, the russian republic, the russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist republic (rSFSr) and of the union of Soviet Socialist republics (uSSr). 
article 60 of the Fundamental Principles of the Legislation of the russian Federation on Culture of 
9 october 1992 establishes that the russian Federation is the State continuer of the uSSr in the 
ownership and use of cultural centers and other cultural organizations abroad.
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the russian Federation may request the opinion of the venice Commission 
of the Council of europe. the Commission made a significant contribution to the 
dismantling of the communist legacy in europe and should be consistent in assessing 
the legitimacy of the 1954 “Crimea acts” as the product of the totalitarian regime 
of the uSSr.
the next step is the appeal of the russian Federation to the international Court 
of Justice with a request to consider the case with participation of ukraine as the 
legal successor of the ukrainian SSr on the grounds of violations of article 2(4) 
of the united nations Charter committed by the ukrainian SSr by adopting the 
1954 “Crimea acts.” as a member of the united nations, the ukrainian SSr was 
obliged to refrain from participating in the separation of Crimea from russia. Such 
violations, as noted by the u.n. international Law Commission, do not have a statute 
of limitations.
the third step is the resumption of negotiations between russia and ukraine. the 
return of Crimea to russia does not exclude, but on the contrary, presupposes the 
need to take into account the interests of ukraine in Crimea, which should be the 
subject of negotiations between russia and ukraine based on goodwill and equal 
standing of the parties. the failure to recognize this obvious requirement inevitably 
leads to a further escalation of the confrontation, which threatens the existence of 
the two states. i warned about this danger repeatedly, in particular in the documents 
on the constitutional reform in the republic of Crimea drafted in 1994–1995.
the fourth step is a broad discussion of decisions taken or not taken by the 
President, the administration of the President, the Security Council, and the ministry 
of Foreign affairs of the russian Federation in defending the interests of russia in 
Crimea and the interests of the people of Crimea. only the light of truth can stop 
russia from falling into the abyss of nothingness by pointing out that:
– the state should serve the common good, and not the interests, ambitions or 
vices of any individual person or group of persons;
– Positions in government or municipal bodies, in diplomatic missions of russia 
in other states and international organizations should belong only to persons who 
are not encumbered by citizenship or residence permit of any foreign state, or who 
have spouses, close relatives, realty and other assets located abroad;
– in the case of Crimea it is impossible to rely on a miracle, goodwill or self-sacrifice 




Comments by the Author at the Preliminary Discussions and the Plenary 
Session of the Venice Commission on the Draft Opinion on “Whether the 
Decision Taken by the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic Crimea 
in Ukraine to Organize a Referendum on Becoming a Constituent Territory  
of the Russian Federation or Restoring the 1992 Constitution of Crimea  
Is Compatible with Constitutional Principles” (CDL-AD (2014)002e)24
the Crimean referendum on coming back of Crimea to the russian Federation may 
not be assessed separately from historic, constitutional and international law factors.
I
1. assessing the history of Crimea, it would be appropriate to note, that its territory 
was a part of a number of ancient russian principalities in the 10th–11th centuries 
and that the russian presence and activities in Crimea and adjacent lands were so 
extensive that the arab geographers of that time preferred to call the Black See as 
“the russian Sea.”
2. the territory of Crimea was returned to russia by the Peace treaty of Kuchuk 
Kainarji signed with turkey on 10 July 1774 and the russian sovereign rights over 
Crimea were finally confirmed by the Peace treaty of yassi of 29 december 1791.
2. the territory of Crimea and the adjacent lands forming the region of taurida were 
developed mainly by the russian population. therefore, it was often designated in the 
documents and maps of the 18th–19th centuries as “novorossiya” (or new russia).
Crimea was not part of malorossiya (Small russia) which is forming the basic axis 
of modern ukraine, including the territories of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Poltava and some 
other regions of ukraine.
3. after the disintegration of the russian empire in 1917, no part of the territory of 
Crimea belonged to the independent ukrainian state formations, such as the ukrainian 
national republic and the ukrainian derzhava (State) which preceded the formation 
of the ukrainian Socialist Soviet republic, one of the founding states of the Soviet 
union (uSSr) in 1922.
24  the author of the article presented the legal position on Crimea at the working meetings and 
the plenary session of the venice Commission on 20–21 march 2014. For more information see 
Хабриева Т.Я., Лафитский В.И. Комментарии к проекту заключения Венецианской комиссии 
«О соответствии конституционным принципам решения Верховного Совета Автономной 
Республики Крым в Украине по организации референдума по вопросу вхождения в качестве 
субъекта в Российскую Федерацию или восстановления Конституции Крыма 1992 г.» // Журнал 
зарубежного законодательства и сравнительного правоведения. 2014. № 1(44). C. 129–135 [talia 
ya. Khabrieva & vladimir i. Lafitsky, Commentary on the Draft Opinion of the Venice Commission on 
Conformity to the Constitutional Principles of the Decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to Organize a Referendum on Becoming a Constituent Territory of the Russian 
Federation or Restoring Crimea’s 1992 Constitution, 1(44) Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative 
Law 129 (2014)]; difficulties of translation, supra note 6; Lafitsky 2017, at 482–493.
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during the Civil war, the territory of Crimea was proclaimed as an integral part 
of russia by all governments which had been replacing each other, including the 
Soviet Socialist republic of taurida and the Crimean Soviet Socialist republic.
Later, on 18 october 1921, it was transformed into the Crimean autonomous 
Soviet Socialist republic and in 1945 into the Crimean oblast (region) remaining in 
the composition of the russian Soviet Federative Socialist republic.
in 1954 the Crimean region was separated from russia and transferred to another 
member state of the union – the ukrainian Soviet Socialist republic. this process 
was launched on the initiative of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the 
Communist party of the Soviet union in January 1954 and was “stamped” in less than 
5 months by the acts of state organs of the Soviet union and both soviet republics 
in violation of the constitutional norms existing at that time.
this gross violation of the principles of legality or the rule of law did not become 
the subject of any disputes which may be explained not only by the inevitable 
repressions which were waiting anybody who dared to oppose even arbitrary 
decisions of the totalitarian regime, but also by the undisputable fact that the 
transfer of Crimea to ukraine was carried out within a single state in which actually 
there were no internal borders, there was a single citizenship and there were uniform 
laws throughout the entire Soviet union.
4. after the collapse of the Soviet union, the legitimacy of these acts was 
repeatedly questioned by the russian authorities.
the Supreme Soviet of the russian Federation adopted a resolution dated 21 may 
1992 no. 2809-1 “on Legal assessment of decisions of the Supreme Bodies of State 
Power of the russian Soviet Federative Socialist republic, Concerning the Change of the 
Status of Crimea, as adopted in 1954” according to which all legal acts pertaining to the 
transfer of the Crimean region to ukraine were recognized as having no legal force from 
the moment of their adoption (para. 1). this act of the Supreme Soviet of the russian 
Federation remains in full legal force for the russian Federation till the present day.
in substantiating the aforesaid decision it was emphasized that the separation 
of the part of the russian Federation and its transfer to the territory of the ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist republic was carried out without consent of the population of Crimea 
and without account of the opinion of the population of russia. the requirements 
providing for the national voting (referendum) envisaged by the Constitution of the 
uSSr of 1936 (art. 49) and the Constitution of the russian SFSr of 1937 (art. 33) were 
not taken into account.
the procedural rule demanding negotiations between the two republics and 
the formal consent of the Supreme Soviet of the russian SFSr for the transfer of the 
part of its territory was also not fulfilled, though it had been directly stipulated by 
article 16 of the Constitution of the russian SFSr of 1937.
it was also emphasized that during the existence of the Soviet union such transfer 
of part of the territory of the russian Federation to another subject of the federation 
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(in this case, to the ukrainian Soviet Socialist republic) didn’t entail essential changes 
in the rights of citizens of Crimea, as it was implemented within the framework of 
an extremely centralized, totalitarian statehood.
the Supreme Soviet of the russian Federation called for interstate negotiations 
between russia and ukraine with the participation of Crimea and with account of 
the will of its population (para. 2 of the aforesaid resolution of 21 may 1992).
5. in Crimea the referendum was held on 20 January 1991, in which 81.3% of 
registered voters of Crimea participated. to the question: “do you support the 
restoration of the Crimean autonomous Soviet Socialist republic, as the subject of the 
uSSr and as the state party to the union treaty” positively responded 1,343,855 voters 
(93.26% of the total number of participating voters). the referendum was recognized 
by the Supreme Soviet of the ukrainian Soviet Socialist republic to be in full conformity 
with legislation of both the Soviet union and ukraine.
the Crimean autonomous republic was reestablished again. State officials of 
Crimea participated in the elaboration of the draft union treaty, representing Crimea 
as a future member state of the renewed union. this i may witness as one of the 
experts involved in consulting on the draft union treaty.
the Supreme Soviet of Crimea adopted on 5 may 1992 the act proclaiming the 
state independence of the republic of Crimea. it was supposed that it would come 
into force after its approval by the all-Crimean referendum appointed to be held on 
august 2, 1992. its participants were asked to vote on two questions:
“are you for independent Crimea in the union with other states”?
“do you approve the act of State independence of the republic of Crimea”?
But on 13 may 1992 the Supreme Soviet of the ukrainian SSr suspended the 
referendum on the ground that it was not in conformity with the Constitution of 
ukraine. two months later, on 9 July 1992, the Supreme Soviet of Crimea declared 
the moratorium on holding of the referendum.
on 6 may 1992 the Constitution of the republic of Crimea was adopted. it 
proclaimed that the republic of Crimea is a rule of law and democratic state and 
that it is in entitled to have the supreme right to natural resources, material, cultural 
and spiritual values and exercises sovereign rights and full authority throughout the 
republic. it also noted, that the state authorities and public officials of the republic of 
Crimea shall exercise on its territory all powers, except those which were voluntarily 
delegated to ukraine and which were enshrined by the constitutional law of the 
republic (art. 1).
at the presidential elections held on 30 January 1994, yu.a. meshkov, the leader 
of the electoral bloc “russia” became the first President of the republic of Crimea. 
in the second round of voting he received 72.9 % of votes of the total number of 
voters taking part in the elections.
in February 1994 – January 1995, the Crimean state authorities adopted a number 
of acts, aimed at strengthening the statehood of Crimea. a significant part of these 
acts, in particular the amendments to the Constitution of the republic of Crimea, 
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draft laws on laws on Government and local self-government, citizenship of the 
republic of Crimea, harmonization of interests of ukraine and russia, were drafted by 
the author of this article jointly with oleg rumyantsev and vyacheslav dodonov.
on 27 march 1994 during the elections of the Supreme Soviet of the republic 
of Crimea the voters participated in the republican poll.
to the first question of the poll: “are you for the restoration of the provision of the 
Constitution of the republic of Crimea of 6 may 1992, which states that the relations 
between the republic of Crimea and ukraine shall be built on the treaty basis?” 78.4% 
of the voters of Crimea answered “yes,” including 83.3% of the voters of Sevastopol.
to the second question of the poll: “are you for restoring the provision of the 
Constitution of the republic of Crimea of 6 may 1992 preserving the right of citizens 
of the republic to have dual citizenship?” 82.8% of voters in Crimea answered “yes,” 
including 87.8% of voters in Sevastopol.
6. Further development of the Crimean statehood was interrupted by the 
government of ukraine. the President of Crimea, some other officials of the republic 
were removed from office on 17 march 1995 according to the Law of ukraine “on repeal 
of the Constitution and Some Laws of the autonomous republic of Crimea.”
Besides the Constitution, the ukrainian government cancelled the laws of the 
republic of Crimea “on elections of the President of the republic of Crimea” of 17 Sep-
tember 1993, “on the President of the republic of Crimea” of 14 october 1993, “on 
restoration of the Constitutional Basis of Statehood of the republic of Crimea” of 20 may 
1994, the Constitutional Law “on the Constitutional Court of the republic of Crimea” 
of 8 September 1994, “on elections of deputies and Chairmen of rural, Settlement, 
district, City, district in Cities Councils” of 18 January 1995.
on 1 november 1995 the new Constitution of Crimea was adopted, which 
considerably reduced the powers of the Crimean government and municipal organs. 
the tendency for minimizing the powers of Crimea was preserved by the Constitution 
of Crimea which was adopted on 21 october 1998 by the Supreme Council of the 
republic of Crimea and was endorsed by the Law of ukraine of 23 december 1998 
which granted it full legal force.
7. the aforesaid historical facts demonstrate that the development of the 
statehood of Crimea was interrupted by the ukrainian authorities in violation of 
the will of the Crimean people and despite the principles of international law.
II
8. We assert that the constitutional law assessment of the Crimean referendum 
should take into account not only the provisions and the general context of the 
constitutions of ukraine and the republic of Crimea, but also the circumstances of 
their application and the dramatic events of February 2014.
the Constitution of ukraine in all its versions of 1996, 2004, 2010, 2014 proclaimed 
that ukraine shall be a sovereign, democratic, law abiding state, which recognizes 
and functions in conformity with the principle of the rule of law.
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However, these basic values of the Constitution of ukraine were violated during 
the February 2014 coup d’état. despite and in violation of constitutionally established 
procedures (arts. 5, 17, 37, 85, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111 and 112), the President of ukraine 
was removed from his office, and his powers were transferred to the verkhovna rada 
of ukraine.
the verkhovna rada adopted a number of other acts which were violating the 
constitutional order. thus, according to the resolution of 24 February 2014 “on 
responding to the Facts of violation of the Judicial oath by Judges of the Constitutional 
Court of ukraine,” five judges of the Constitutional Court, including its Chairman, were 
compelled to terminate ahead of time the executions of their functions. at the same 
time, the General Procurator was instructed to initiate criminal proceedings against 
all judges who, in the opinion of the deputies of the verkhovna rada, were guilty for 
voting in the support of the decision of the Constitutional Court of 30 September 2010 
requiring to observe the procedure for amending the Constitution of ukraine.
this decision of the verkhovna rada, violating the independence and immunity of 
judges, contradicted not only to the basic principles of the Constitution, but also to the 
international law obligations of ukraine, which were established, in particular, by the 
recommendation no. r (94) 12 on the independence of Judges which had been enacted 
on 13 october 1994 by the Committee of ministers of the Council of europe with the aim 
to prevent any measures that may jeopardize the independence of judges.
the verkhovna rada of ukraine, in violation of the requirements of the Consti-
tution, was intensively amending its text.
the Constitution of ukraine requires that its amendments (with the exception of 
the chapters devoted to general provisions, elections and referendums, procedures 
for changing the Constitution) have to be approved in two consecutive regular 
sessions of the verkhovna rada: in the first session by the majority of votes and in the 
next session by no less than two-thirds of votes of the constitutional composition of 
the verkhovna rada (art. 155 of the Constitution). Special procedure is established 
for amending the three chapters of the Constitution mentioned above. Such 
constitutional amendments ought to be adopted by no less than two-thirds of votes 
of the constitutional composition of the verkhovna rada and approved by an all-
ukrainian referendum (art. 156 of the Constitution).
a draft law introducing constitutional amendments may be considered by the 
verkhovna rada only upon the availability of an opinion of the Constitutional Court 
on the conformity of the draft law with the provisions of articles 157 and 158 of the 
Constitution, which require that the Constitution of ukraine shall not be changed, 
if the amendments are proposed in the circumstances of martial law or state of 
emergency; it they foresee the abolition or restriction of human and citizens’ rights 
and freedoms; if they lead to the liquidation of the independence or violation of the 
territorial indivisibility of ukraine and so on.
these requirements were not observed by the constitutional reform launched 
by the coup d’état of February 2014.
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9. Such circumstances of unconstitutional coup d’etat, destruction of the system 
of state power, gross violations of the rule of law make it not possible to assess the 
referendum in Crimea on the basis and in terms of the Constitution and laws of 
ukraine, because they were deprived of the quality of legality and created the state 
of legal uncertainty. it is impossible to say definitely, what version of the Constitution 
of ukraine was in force at that time.
in such circumstances it is quite natural, that the republic of Crimea regarded 
its own constitutional acts and the will of its population as prevailing over the 
Constitution and the will of the state organs of ukraine. the same approach shall 
be followed by the venice Commission.
10. according to the Constitution of the republic of Crimea, the Supreme Council 
of the republic of Crimea has the power to make a decision on holding a republican 
(local) referendum.
the legislation of ukraine does not regulate the procedures of republican (local) 
referendums.
nevertheless, at the request of the General Prosecutor’s office of ukraine, the Kiev 
district administrative Court enacted on 4 march 2014 the decision which declared 
the referendum of the republic of Crimea illegal. Several days later, on 7 march 
2014, the acting President of ukraine a. turchynov, in violation of the requirements 
of the Constitution of ukraine, made a decision to suspend the resolution of the 
Supreme Council of the republic of Crimea on holding an all-Crimean referendum. 
on the same day (march 7), the said resolution of the Supreme Council of Crimea 
was declared canceled by the administrative Court of Kiev.
an appropriate appeal was filed in the Constitutional Court of ukraine, but it was 
not able to hold a plenary session due to the lack of quorum, which was caused by 
the forced resignation of five members of the Court, as have been mentioned above. 
to overcome this procedural obstacle, the verkhovna rada of ukraine appointed on 
13 march 2014 four new judges of the Constitutional Court. this made it possible to 
hold on the next day (14 march 2014) a plenary session of the Constitutional Court of 
ukraine, at which the resolution of the Supreme Council of the republic of Crimea 
on holding a referendum was declared unconstitutional.
Such actions were not in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution 
and laws of ukraine.
III
11. the referendum of the republic of Crimea may not be assessed beyond 
or without due account of the requirements of international law, that provide the 
protection of the population of Crimea as a national minority in ukraine.
the verkhovna rada of ukraine canceled the Law on Language Policy of 2012, 
according to which the russian language had the status of a regional language in 
the republic of Crimea. this act has violated the rights of the russian-speaking and 
other non-ukrainian nationalities of Crimea and was not in conformity not only with 
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the Constitution of ukraine (arts. 10, 11, 34 and 53), but with its international law 
commitments, established by the european Charter for regional or minority Languages 
of 1992 and the Council of europe Framework Convention for the Protection of national 
minorities of 1995. ukraine joined the said acts in 2006 and 1998, respectively.
the legal assessment of the decision of the Supreme Council of the republic of 
Crimea to hold a referendum cannot be complete, objective and comprehensive 
without taking into account broad international law implications and meaning.
12. the referendum of the republic of Crimea does not contradict the international 
law requirements. according to the Constitution of ukraine, the autonomous republic 
of Crimea has a special legal status. the word “republic” is usually conceived in 
international law as one of the features or qualities of a sovereign state, which indicates 
that the people of such state have the right to determine their own historical fate.
the right of peoples to self-determination is widely recognized in modern 
international law and has been consolidated in a number of key international legal 
acts. Part 2 of article 1 of the Charter of the united nations obliges states to respect 
the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples, considering it as the 
basis for the development of the modern world.
Paragraph 2 of the 1960 declaration on the Granting of independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (adopted by resolution no. 1514 (Xv) of the united nations 
of the General assembly on 14 december 1960) states that all peoples have the right 
to self-determination, and therefore they have the right to freely establish their own 
political status and carry out their economic, social and cultural development.
the same principle was enshrined in the international human rights covenants of 
1966 (para. 1 of art. 1 of the international Covenant on economic, Social and Cultural 
rights and para. 1 of art. 1 of the international Covenant on Civil and Political rights). 
at the same time, it is important to note, that the international legal norms do not 
provide for any exceptions, as established by national constitutions or laws.
moreover, paragraph 3 of the aforesaid articles of the international human rights 
covenants requires, that all participating states shall be obliged, in accordance with 
the provisions of the united nations Charter, to promote the exercise of the right to 
self-determination and to respect this right.
ukraine has been a party to the international covenants on human rights since 
1976. accordingly, it is fully obliged by these requirements as a member state of 
the united nations.
13. the declaration on the principles of international law concerning friendly 
relations and cooperation between states in accordance with the united nations 
Charter 1970 (adopted by resolution 2625 (XXv) of the u.n. General assembly of 
24 october 1970), reaffirmed and developed the provisions of the united nations 
Charter and other international legal documents on the right of peoples to self-
determination. in particular, it established that, by virtue of the principle of equality 
and self-determination of peoples, enshrined in the united nations Charter, all 
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peoples have the right to freely determine, without outside interference, their 
political status and to carry out their economic, social and cultural development, 
and each state is obliged to respect this right in in accordance with the provisions 
of the Charter.
at the same time, it should be noted that the declaration calls each state to 
refrain from any violent actions aimed at depriving peoples of the right to self-
determination, freedom and independence. in the event of violent actions against 
the right to self-determination, peoples have the right to seek support and receive 
it in accordance with the united nations Charter.
appropriate guidelines are provided by the decision of the international Court of 
Justice in the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (iCJ 
reports 1986, pp. 101–103, paras. 191–193). it noted that the aforesaid declaration 
reflects customary international law and that its provisions can be regarded as 
generally recognized principles and norms of international law.
14. in accordance with Section viii of the Final act of the 1975 Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in europe, the participating States undertake the obligation 
to respect the equal rights of peoples, in particular their right to self-determination – 
“in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external 
status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, 
economic, social and cultural development.”
the principles of equality and self-determination of peoples have been repeatedly 
emphasized in many other international legal acts, including the vienna declaration 
and Program of action adopted at the World Conference on Human rights on 25 
June 1993, african Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights 1981, etc.
15. international law proclaims in the most general terms the principles and 
norms pertaining to referendums. as a rule, these norms are aimed at providing for 
the free expression of will of citizens participating in elections or referendums. the 
universal declaration of Human rights of 1948 in paragraph 3 of article 21 provides 
that the will of the people should be the basis of the authority of government, and 
that elections should be held according to the principles of universal and equal 
suffrage by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedures.
the same requirements shall be applied to referendums, taking into account the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of article 21 of the universal declaration, which guarantee 
the right of everyone to take part in the government of his country directly.
the referendum in Crimea was held in accordance with the legislation of the 
republic of Crimea and the aforesaid international law standards, which was noted by 
the international observers, including the members of the european Parliament.
16. assessing the international law implications of the referendum of the republic 
of Crimea, it would be appropriate to note, that it confirmed the declaration of 
independence of the republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which was 
adopted on 11 march 2014 by the Supreme Council of the republic of Crimea and 
the Sevastopol City Council.
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17. the international law assessment of the referendum of the republic of Crimea 
shall also take into account the advisory opinion “on accordance with international 
law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo” of the 
international Court of Justice of 22 July 2010.
this document states that the unilateral declaration of independence based 
on the principle of self-determination of peoples does not violate the principles 
and norms of international law, and that since the second half of the twentieth 
century, the international right to self-determination has developed in the direction 
of creating the right to independence of the peoples of non-self-governing territories 
under foreign domination and operation.
18. in conclusion, it would be appropriate to note that secession is not a pheno-
menon of recent decades. one of its first acts was the withdrawal of texas from 
mexico in 1836 and its incorporation into the united States in 1845 under the 
circumstances, which are comparable in many respects to the secession of Crimea 
from ukraine and its subsequent return to russia. i believe that we can be guided 
by such an analogy.
Appendix No. 2
Draft Federal Law 
“On Recognizing the Normative Legal Acts of the USSR and the RSFSR  
on the Transfer of Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR  
as Not Generating Legal Consequences from the Moment of Their Adoption 
and Not Having Legal Force Due to the Failure of These Acts to Conform  
to Fundamental Principles of International Law and Rule of Law State”
the Federal assembly of the russian Federation,
Having considered the circumstances of the adoption of decisions by the political 
party and state bodies of the uSSr and the rSFSr on the transfer in 1954 of Crimea 
from the russian Soviet Federative Socialist republic to the ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
republic, which violated the constitutional norms and fundamental principles of 
international law that were in force at that time, including the principles of justice, 
rule of law and self-determination of peoples;
Based on the provisions of the Constitution of the russian Federation on the 
revival of the sovereign statehood of russia and the preservation of its historically 
established state unity;
Confirming the legal force of the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the russian 
Federation of 21 may 1992 no. 2809-1 “on the Legal assessment of decisions of the 
Highest Bodies of State Power of the rSFSr on Changing the Status of Crimea, adopted 
in 1954,” which acknowledged the resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the rSFSr of 5 February 1954 “on the transfer of the Crimean region from the 
rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr” as having no legal force from the moment of its adoption 
on the ground that it violated the Constitution (Basic Law) of the rSFSr;
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recognizing the results of the referendum held in Crimea on 20 January 1991, 
which reflected the aspiration and will of the absolute majority of the Crimean 
population to join the Soviet union, which is continued by the russian Federation;
noting that the development of the statehood of the republic of Crimea was 
forcibly interrupted on 17 march 1995 with the adoption of the Law of ukraine “on the 
abolition of the Constitution and Some Laws of the autonomous republic of Crimea” 
and the removal from office of the first President of Crimea, yu.a. meshkov;
taking into account the will of the population of the republic of Crimea to secede 
from ukraine due to the coup d’état in ukraine committed in February 2014;
Confirming the irreversibility of rejoining of the republic of Crimea and the 
federal city of Sevastopol with the russian Federation in accordance with the will 
of the absolute majority of the population of Crimea, which was confirmed by the 
referendum on 16 march 2014, and the acknowledgement by the Constitution of 
the russian Federation of the legal status of the republic of Crimea and the federal 
city of Sevastopol as the subjects of the russian Federation;
defending the fundamental principles of the rule of law state,
adopts this Federal Law.
Article 1. On the Recognition as Not Generating Legal Consequences from the Moment 
of Adoption and Having No Legal Force of Normative Legal and Other Acts of the USSR 
and the RSFSR on the Transfer of Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR
1. the russian Federation, as a continuer and legal successor of the uSSr, the 
rSFSr and the russian empire, recognizes the following normative legal and other 
acts of the uSSr and the rSFSr on the transfer of Crimea from the rSFSr and to the 
ukrainian SSr as not generating legal consequences from the moment of adoption 
and not having legal force:
decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSu of 25 January 1954 
“on the approval of the draft decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
uSSr on the transfer of the Crimean region from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr,”
resolution of the Council of ministers of the rSFSr “on the transfer of the Crimean 
region from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr” dated 5 February 1954,
resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the rSFSr “on the transfer of 
the Crimean region from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr” dated 5 February 1954,
decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the uSSr of 19 February 1954 
on the approval of the draft decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
uSSr “on the transfer of the Crimean region from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr,”
the uSSr Law “on the transfer of the Crimean region from the rSFSr to the 
ukrainian SSr” dated 26 april 1954, which approved the decree of the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet of the uSSr dated 19 February 1954,
amendments to articles 22 and 23 of the Constitution of the uSSr, introduced 
by the uSSr Law “on the transfer of the Crimean region from the rSFSr to the 
ukrainian SSr” dated 26 april 1954.
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2. the aforesaid normative legal acts of the uSSr and the rSFSr on the transfer 
of Crimea from the rSFSr to the ukrainian SSr are acknowledged as not generating 
legal consequences from the moment of their adoption and not having legal force 
on the following grounds:
irreparable grave violations of the fundamental principles of international law 
requiring the observance of justice, self-determination of peoples, compliance of 
the norms of law, that were enshrined in the Charter of the united nations and other 
international law documents and were in force at the time of the adoption of the 
aforesaid acts of the uSSr and rSFSr;
irreparable grave violations of the requirements of the Constitution of the uSSr 
and the Constitution of the rSFSr, specifying the powers of the organs of state 
power of the uSSr and the rSFSr and establishing the decision-making procedures 
of the aforesaid state organs;
the incompatibility of these acts with the fundamental principles of the rule of 
law state, enshrined in the Constitution of the russian Federation of 1993.
Article 2. Entry of this Federal Law into Force
this Federal Law shall enter into force within ten days from the date of its official 
publication.
Article 3. On Measures to Ensure the Consistency of the Legal System of the Russian 
Federation
1. the conformity of this Federal Law to the Constitution of the russian Federation 
shall be established by the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation at the request 
of the President of the russian Federation in the procedure prescribed by paragraph 
“a” of part 5.1 of article 125 of the Constitution of the russian Federation.
2. if a contradiction arises between this Federal law and any other normative 
legal act of the russian Federation, the priority shall be given to the provisions of 
this Federal law.
References
История Крыма с древнейших времен до наших дней (в очерках) [History of Crimea 
from the Ancient Time and Till Our Days (Essays)] (Simferopol: atlas-Comact, 2006).
Федоров А.В. Правовой статус Крыма. Правовой статус Севастополя [Fedorov a.v. 
Legal Status of Crimea. Legal Status of Sevastopol] (moscow: mSu Publishing House, 
1999).
Latsa a. Un printemps russe (Genève: Éditions des Syrtes, 2016).
 
Information about the author
Vladimir Lafitsky (Moscow, Russia) – Professor, Kutafin moscow State Law 
university (mSaL) (9 Sadovaia-Kudrunskaia St., 9, moscow, 125993, russia; e-mail: 
vlafitskiy@gmail.com).
